Kahneman D., Tversky A. (eds.) Choices, Values and Frames

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. — 1108 p. — ISBN: 0521621720, 9780521621724.This book presents a selection of the research that grew from the editors’ early collaboration on “Prospect Theory,” the landmark article that offered the first compelling alternative to the standard “rational agent” model of choice under risk. In the spirit of the highly influential volume Judgment Under Uncertainty, first published in 1982, this book collects numerous theoretical and empirical articles that have become classics, important extensions, and applications that range from principles of legal compensation to the behavior of New York cab drivers on busy days. Several surveys prepared especially for this volume illustrate the scope and vigor of the behavioral study of choice. Theoretically elegant and empirically robust, the research collected in this volume represents an approach to the science of decision-making that has influenced numerous fields of study, including decision theory, behavioral economics, behavioral finance, consumer psychology, the study of negotiation and conflict, medical decision-making, legal analysis and practice, well-being studies, political science, and philosophical investigations of rationality and ethics. The book provides an accessible introduction to the study of decision-making behavior and is an indispensable reference source for students and specialists.Choices, Values, and Frames.
Prospect theory and extensions.
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.
Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty.
The uncertainty effect and the weighting function.
Compound Invariant Weighting Functions in Prospect Theory.
Weighing Risk and Uncertainty.
A Belief-Based Account of Decision under Uncertainty.
Loss aversion and the value function.
Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model.
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.
The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves.
A Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences.
Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk Aversion.
Framing and mental accounting.
Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.
Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions.
Mental Accounting Matters.
Applications.
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice.
Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field.
Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle.
Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market.
Money Illusion.
Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time.
Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?
Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking.
Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach.
Judicial Choice and Disparities between Measures of Economic Values.
Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyzes of Political Choice.
Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective.
The multiplicity of value: reversals of preference.
The Construction of Preference.
Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice.
Context-Dependent Preferences.
Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance.
Attribute Evaluability: Its Implications for Joint – Separate Evaluation Reversals and Beyond.
Choice over time.
Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes.
Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation.
Alternative conceptions of value.
Reason-Based Choice.
Value Elicitation: Is There Anything in There?
Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions?
An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues.
Experienced utility and objective happiness.
Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach.
Evaluation by Moments: Past and Future.
Endowments and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being.
A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes.
The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety-Seeking Behavior.
New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption.