Shrader C.R. History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 2, 1961-1973

Washington: Dept. of the Army, 2008. — 398 p.The 1960s and early 1970s were a tumultuous period in world history. Insurgent political movements as well as profound economic and social changes affected many regions of the world, including the United States. The rapid changes in technology and the shifting international political scene, most particularly the Communist insurgency in Vietnam, forced substantial changes in U.S. Army weaponry, organization, and doctrine. Coping with such fundamental and rapid change would not have been possible without the use of operations research and systems analysis (ORSA) techniques to aid Army decision makers in dealing with a complex present and a cloudy future.
In this, the second of three proposed volumes on the history of operations research in the United States Army, Dr. Charles R. Shrader identifies, describes, and evaluates the ideas, people, organizations, and events that influenced the development of ORSA in the Army from the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy in 1961 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973. Basing his work on extensive research of the surviving archival materials, official publications, books, articles, and interviews with key personnel, he clearly and concisely outlines the impact on the Army ORSA program of the McNamara revolution in defense management, the development of new organizations and methods for managing ORSA activities, the establishment of the ORSA Officer Specialist Program, the expansion of in-house ORSA elements, the contributions of ORSA contractors, and the important role played by ORSA in the studies of counterinsurgency and airmobility that preceded the commitment of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam. He also describes in some detail the organization and functions of Army ORSA elements in Vietnam, the work of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam, and the two major evaluations of Army combat operations conducted in country, the Army Combat Operations in Vietnam study and the Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam study as well as the use of ORSA techniques at field force, division, and lower levels.
In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1973 and the beginning of the period of recovery from America’s long involvement in Southeast Asia. The final volume will cover the development of Army ORSA from 1973 to 1995, the post-Vietnam period of recovery and reorganization that led to a 100-hour victory in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision. All three volumes in the series are recommended for study not only by those of us in the Army analysis community but by civilian leaders, military commanders, and staff officers at all levels. The story of ORSA in the U.S. Army provides many important insights into Army decision making, the adaptation of science to military affairs, the process by which we design and evaluate weapons and other equipment, tactical organization and doctrine, strategy, and management of the Army.