British Army Field Manual. Volume 1. Part 10. Countering Insurgency

Ministry of Defense (MOD) GB, 2009. - 278 p. British Army Field Manual. Fighting rebels (in the sense of rebels, insurgents, partisans).It is over eight years since the Army last published counterinsurgency doctrine. Much has changed since then. This manual is a short guide toinsurgency, and the principles and approaches needed to counter it. It has been written to complement allied and joint doctrine and the authors have been careful to ensure that the principles and framework that are explained in Part A are entirely coherent with those in UK joint doctrine and that of our principal allies, in particular USA, Canada and Australia. For maximum effect Part A should be read as a single continuous narrative while Part B can be read in its constituent chapters. AFM Countering Insurgency describes how the British Army plans and conducts counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level. It explains that efforts must be focused on securing the local population and gaining andmaintaining popular support. This is a task for the host nation, its security forces, British forces and our allies, in concert with our partners across
government. The doctrine explains why this is not simply a military undertaking but a battle of political wills with several lines of operationacting in concert. It is axiomatic that security forces of all types lead in providing an environment sufficiently stable to allow the other instruments of governance can be brought to bear to improve the lives of the local population. Providing effective security is a complex, dangerous, and bloodybusiness; it takes time and resources and it tests the resolve of all involved. These are enduring characteristics of counterinsurgency. Doctrine is ‘what is taught’, and to be effective it needs to be read and understood. Pragmatism is needed, however, in its application. Every ounterinsurgency campaign is different from the last, but history and experience show that a thorough knowledge of the doctrine and a clear understanding of the operational environment are two essential prerequisites. Doctrine provides commanders at the tactical level with the basis on which to build this understanding, and requires them to use their experience and judgement to develop the right approach to the particular circumstances in which they find themselves. As such it is focussed at the brigade level and below and educationally for the ICSC(L) student. While the authors of this publication have consulted widely with experienced practitioners and academic experts and endeavoured to include a broad range of ideas, it is not a comprehensive textbook on insurgency or counterinsurgency. Nor is it specific to a particular theatre of operation or a particular insurgent group.