Golitsyn Anatoliy. New lies for old. The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation

New York: Dodd Mead, 1984. — 402 p. — ISBN10: 0396081940; ISBN13: 978-0396081944Anatoliy Golitsyn is a controversial figure when it comes to analysing international relations and political events. The ex-KGB officer defected to the USA in 1961, but became either loved or loathed in the intelligence community for what many saw as his “conspiracy theories.” This book appears to be the relation of his theories to a much broader historical context. New Lies for Old sees Golitsyn “expose” the methods of the USSR with regards to its long-term foreign policy objectives. The book itself is unexpectedly rich in its history. Golitsyn clearly has an immense grasp of communist politics from the period of the 1917 Russian Revolutions onwards. The main point of this thesis is to “expose” and explain the Soviet strategy of disinformation and apply it to historical events that the West “misread” by failing to appreciate the Soviet strategy. Golitsyn takes us back to Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP), implemented in 1921, which was used post-Civil War in order to stabilise the Bolshevik control of the Russian state by basically reverting to effectively capitalist methods (such as free enterprise) in order to prevent mass starvation and resentment of the regime, and to garner at least a more passive response from Western nations. By the time the NEP ended, the Bolsheviks had amassed enough control of the state that Stalin was immediately able to implement his dramatic new policies. Thus, the NEP was effectively a tool of deception used to form a false narrative and expectation of what a communist Russia would be like, with the true communist aims manifesting themselves once it would be secure doing so. Golitsyn argues that, after the regime crisis once Stalin died, this Leninist policy of pragmatism and deception became the long-term goal of a communist bloc united around the aim of global communism. He explains that, with the experience of growing alienation of both the populace and international community of Stalinism, and of genuine factions within the communist bloc, the Soviets masterminded a long-term strategy designed to lull the West into a false sense of security. [DoesReviews @ Amazon]Editors's ForewordThe Two MethodologiesThe Problems Facing Western Analysts
The Patterns of Disinformation: "Weakness and Evolution"
The Patterns of Disinformation: Transition
The New Policy and Disinformation Strategy
The Shelepin Report and Changes in Organization
The New Role of Intelligence
Sources of Information
The Vulnerability of Western Assessments
Communist Intelligence Successes, Western Failures, and the Crisis in Western Studies
Western Errors
The New MethodologyThe Disinformation Program and Its Impact on the WestThe First Disinformation Operation: The Soviet-Yugoslav "Dispute" of 1958-60
The Second Disinformation Operation: The "Evolution" of the Soviet Regime, Part One: Major Changes in the USSR
The Third Disinformation Operation: The Soviet-Albanian "Dispute" and "Split"
The Fourth Disinformation Operation: The Sino-Soviet "Split"
The Fifth Disinformation Operation: Romanian "Independence"
The Sixth Disinformation Operation:
The Alleged Recurrence of Power Struggles in the Soviet, Chinese, and Other Parties
The Seventh Disinformation Operation: "Democratization" in Czechoslovakia in 1968
The Second Disinformation Operation: The "Evolution" of the Soviet Regime, Part Two: The "Dissident" Movement
The Eighth Disinformation Operation: Continuing Eurocommunist Contacts with the Soviets — The New Interpretation of Eurocommunism
The Role of Disinformation and Intelligence Potential in the Realization of the Communist Strategies
The Evidence of Overall Co-ordination between the Communist Governments and Parties
The Impact of the Disinformation ProgramThe Final Phase and the Western Counter-StrategyThe Final Phase
Where Now?