Hofschröer P. 1815: The Waterloo Campaign. Wellington, his German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras

London: Greenhill Books, 1998. - 396 pgs. Since 1815 it has been an article of faith among German historians that Wellington deceived Blücher during the opening phase of the campaign, promising quick support that was actually impossible because of the tardy concentration of the British forces. So assured, Blücher stood to fight at Ligny, got whipped and - except for d'Erlon's inexplicable meandering - undoubtedly would have been completely crushed, leaving Wellington with an unpleasant assortment of alternatives including a nineteenth-century Dunkirk. Almost all British historians have vehemently rejected such imputations. But some have believed that, whether inadvertently or intentionally, Wellington did mislead Blücher as to when and in what strength British reinforcements might reach him. Hofschröer believes that this deception was intentional, that Wellington deliberately risked sacrificing Blücher in order to gain time for his own fumbled concentration. He traces this Anglo-Prussian friction back to the squabbling Congress of Vienna and Wellington's role in the British effort to restrain Prussian territorial rapacity, followed by - after Napoleon's return from Elba - the two nations' competition in getting the contingents of the smaller German states for their respective armies. Hofschröer does not whitewash Prussia: the arrogant stupidity with which Blücher and Gneisenau mishandled the Saxon troops, the sloppy Prussian staff functioning and the ramshackle state of the Prussian Army itself are presented in detail. The opening moves of the campaign are traced in depth, backed by research and careful space-and-time studies. It appears that the Allies were better informed of Napoleon's concentration than has been previously realized, but that Wellington badly misjudged Napoleon's probable strategy and was slow to react.